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Articles & Essays
PREEMPTION'S MARKET PARTICIPANT
IMMUNITY - A CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR LIVING
WAGE AND LABOR PEACE POLICIES
Roger C. Hartleyt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nationwide, state and local governments are adopting policies that
oblige their private-sector business partners to pay employees a "living
wage" and/or to agree in various ways not to use public funds to finance
anti-union activities. Conventional labor preemption principles would
invalidate many of these conditional business arrangements unless they are
immunized by preemption's market participant doctrine, first applied in the
now decade-old Boston Harbor case.'
Accordingly, the focus of
preemption litigation challenging living wage and labor peace policies
ordinarily is the immunity's applicability. Because its reach is subject to
widely varying interpretations, there exists a need to fix workable and
principled limits for the immunity's operation. This article addresses that
need.
Part II briefly describes labor law preemption but moves straightaway
into a discussion of the market participant immunity doctrine. This
examination shows that consistent administration of the immunity is
thwarted by deep divisions among the lower courts. Coherency depends on
resolving several discernible categories of disagreement.
Part III proposes a solution. Itargues that the immunity serves the

t © Roger C. Hartley 2002. Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law, The
Catholic University of America. All rights reserved.
1. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders &
Contractors, 507 U.S. 218 (1993) [hereinafter Boston Harbor].
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constitutional function of restraining Congress's preemptive authority to
assure states an equality of treatment with the private sector. Stated
otherwise, my thesis is that the outcome in Boston Harbor was
constitutionally prescribed. From this interpretation I demonstrate that
disputes regarding a state's assertion of the immunity should be resolved by
inquiring first into whether federal labor law would privilege a similarly
situated private-sector employer to engage in the activity for which local
government claims immunity protection. If so, then the outcome should
turn on whether local government's purpose was to promote its own
proprietary self-interest or whether it engaged in that activity as a pretext
for setting labor policy.
Part IV applies this two-part standard to analyze living wage and labor
peace policies. Some are valid because they fall within a well-established
labor preemption exception having nothing to do with market participant
theory. Others are likely to be found invalid because they regulate within
labor law's protected zones and courts are not likely to extend the market
participant immunity to them. For the rest, I show that while the state may
be acting within a zone also occupied by federal labor law, market
participant immunity provides a safe harbor.
II.

LABOR PREEMPTION, MARKET PARTICIPANT IMMUNITY, AND THE
LOWER COURTS' STRUGGLE TO FIND COHERENCE

A.

An Overview of Labor Preemption

The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)2
contains no express preemption provision.' Hence, the Act does not
preempt state law "unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate

the federal scheme, or unless the [Court] discern[s] from the totality of the
circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of
the States. ' '4 Most labor preemption is either conflict or frustration
(obstacle) preemption because the NLRA has been interpreted as not
generally occupying the entire field of labor relations.'
2. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§141-197
[hereinafter referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act].
3. See Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
469, 560 & n.508 (1993) (providing a thorough review of labor preemption and the
academic literature).
4. Metro. Life Ins. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 747-48 (1985) (citations omitted, internal
quotations omitted).
5. Section 301 preemption is the exception. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 220-21 (1985).
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State law can conflict with the Act by adopting standards of conduct
inconsistent with the substantive requirements of federal labor law by, for
example, requiring what federal law prohibits. In such cases, the U.S.
Constitution's Supremacy Clause 6 alone trumps state law, obviating the
need for inquiry into congressional intent. 7 Most labor preemption,
however, entails state action that does not literally contravene a federal
right or prohibition. State law is preempted because, notwithstanding
Congressional silence, the Court has determined that Congress so intends to
preempt since state law frustrates federal labor policy.8
What has come to be known as Garmon preemption protects the
supremacy of federal rights and the integrity of the National Labor
Relations Board's ("NLRB") primary jurisdiction. 9
With certain
exceptions, it preempts state and local law that regulates conduct actually
or even arguably protected by section 7 of the Act or prohibited by section
8.10 Machinists preemption11 advances a different congressional policy:
that certain conduct should be left unregulated by any governmental body.
It prohibits state and local regulation that the courts conclude "upset[s] the
balance of power between labor and management expressed in our national
labor policy"' 2 by "introduc[ing] some standard of properly 'balanced'
bargaining power... [or defining] what economic sanctions might be
permitted negotiating parties in an 'ideal' or 'balanced' state of collective
bargaining."' 3
The Court conceptualizes these above-described labor preemption
principles as follows: "When we say that the NLRA preempts state law, we
mean that the NLRA prevents a State from regulating within a protected
6. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
7. The Supremacy Clause also trumps state law that prohibits what federal law
permits, even though simultaneous compliance with both laws is literally possible. See infra
note 10 and accompanying text.
8. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 623 (1986)
(Golden State I) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing how labor preemption developed
from "a series of implications" regarding congressional intent "in the face of congressional
silence").
9. San Diego Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
10. 29 U.S.C.A. §151 et. seq. Section 7 of the Act creates rights of employees to selforganization (including the right to refrain from self-organization). See discussion infra
note 115 and accompanying text. Section 8 describes various employer and union unfair
labor practices.
11. See Lodge 76, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. Wis. Employee Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 140 (1976).
12. Id. at 146 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953)).
13. Golden State Transit Corp., 475 U.S. at 619 (Golden State I) (quoting Machinists,
427 U.S. at 149-150).
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zone, whether it be a zone protected and reserved for market freedom.., or
What is left are "many areas in which states
for NLRB jurisdiction ....
may appropriately intercede in the relationships between employees and
employers. 15
One important labor preemption exception is found in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.16 There, the Court considered, and
rejected, a preemption challenge to a state statute that provided for
minimum health care protection for all workers in the state. The Court
concluded that when a state enacts legislation intended to provide
minimum benefits for employees, and not designed to interfere with the
process of collective bargaining, it does not upset the balance of economic
weapons built into our labor law."
B.

Incoherence in the Market ParticipantImmunity Doctrine

Boston Harbor'scontribution to labor preemption was privileging the
States, for the first time, to take action directly affecting matters within
The Court stressed that labor
labor preemption's protected zones.
preemption comes into play only when government is regulating within a
protected zone and not when government acts as a proprietor, "interact[ing]
This autonomy to
with private participants in the marketplace."' 8
participate freely in the marketplace, the Court concluded in Boston
Harbor,is "consistent with [labor] preemption principles."' 9
Unfortunately, the Boston Harbor decision neither describes these
labor preemption principles nor explains why or how they entitle the states
to a certain degree of autonomy to "participate freely in the marketplace." 2 °
This absence of doctrinal foundation for the market participant immunity
has caused the lower courts to seek guidance elsewhere, primarily in the
facts of Boston Harbor. The result has been widely disparate approaches
for determining when government acts as a regulator versus market
participant.
Boston Harbor was an ideal litigation vehicle for establishing labor
preemption's market participant immunity. There, the Massachusetts
Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") contracted for the construction of
sewage treatment and other facilities within Boston Harbor, facilities it

14. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders &
Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1993).
15. Babler Bros. v. Roberts, 995 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1993).
16. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
17. See id. at 757.
18. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist., 507 U.S. at 227.
19. Id. at 230.
20. Id. at 230-31.
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would own and manage upon completion of construction.2 The MWRA
entered into a project labor agreement with the local Building and
Construction Trades Council ("BCTC") that "was specifically tailored to
one particular job, the Boston Harbor cleanup project 2 2 and, therefore, did
not affect the labor relations choices on any other public or private
construction site. The PLA recognized the BCTC as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees on the project "to ensure an
efficient project that would be completed as quickly and effectively as
possible at the lowest CoSt., 23 This project labor agreement, if it had been
entered into by parties subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRA, would have
been lawful. 4 Acting "in the role of purchaser of construction services...
[the MWRA] act[ed] just like a private contractor would act, and
condition[ed] its purchasing upon the very sort of labor agreement that
Congress explicitly authorized and expected frequently to find ....
,25
In these circumstances, the Court held in Boston Harborthat "[i]n the
absence of any express or implied indication by Congress that a State may
not manage its own property when it pursues its purely proprietary
interests, and where analogous private conduct would be permitted, [the
Supreme Court] will not infer such a restriction., 26 The Court has not
subsequently clarified the immunity. Incoherence reigns in the lower
courts because of differences with respect to the point where variation from
Boston Harbor'sfacts removes the immunity.
This disarray in the lower courts falls into several discernable
categories. Most courts do seem to follow the Supreme Court's example
by examining whether the government's purpose was proprietary or based
on a desire to set labor policy.2 7 The lower courts are divided, however,
21. Id.at 221.
22. Id. at 232.
23. Id. at 232.
24. Id. at 222, 230.
25. Id., at 233 (quoting Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I. v. Mass. Water
Resources Auth., 935 F.2d 345, 361 (1st Cir. 1991) (Breyer, C.J. dissenting), rev'd, Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders and Contractors of
Mass./R. I. (Boston Harbor), 507 U.S. 218 (1993)).
26. Id. at 231-32 (citation omitted).
27. See Wisc. Dep't of Indus. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 291 (1986) (holding that a
statute disqualifying persons from doing business with the State, when such persons had
violated the Taft-Hartley Act three times within a five-year period, is not immunityprotected because "[t]he manifest purpose and inevitable effect of the debarment rule is to
enforce the requirements of the NLRA"); see also Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the
Metro. Dist., 507 U.S. at 229 (distinguishing Gould because the agency had "no interest in
setting [labor]policy")(emphasis added).
The lower courts generally follow this invocation to examine purpose.
See
Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 190 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that California's apprenticeship minimum wage law does not qualify for the
immunity because its purpose was "to regulate apprenticeship programs and wages paid on
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with respect to the validity of applying a per se test that categorically
excludes from the immunity's protection any government-wide
procurement policy. 28 In Building & Construction Trades Department v.

public works projects" and the policy requires the continued involvement of the state after
the public works contract is executed; but nevertheless holding that the law is not preempted
because it qualified as minimum standards legislation); see also Cardinal Towing & Auto
Repair v. City of Bedford, Tx., 180 F.3d 686, 691-93 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
market participant/regulator distinction is best understood as an analytical mechanism for
"isolat[ing] a class of government involvements in the market... [where] a regulatory
impulse can be safely ruled out" because the totality of circumstances shows that
government acted to "serve the government's own needs rather than those of society as a
whole"); Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Seward, 966 F.2d 492, 495-96 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that a city's requirement that contractors on a public works project agree
to a work preservation clause protecting jobs of the city's own employees was not
preempted because "there [was] no reason to believe that the work preservation clause was
motivated by labor regulatory goals"); Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San
Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (preempting a city ordinance that
prohibited the city from contracting with companies whose employee benefits policies
discriminated between employees with spouses and employees with domestic partners
because "the City undoubtedly passed the Ordinance with the policy goals in mind.., to
stop discrimina[tion] in the provision of employee benefits.")
28. Compare Chamber of Commerce v. Reich (Reich I), 74 F.3d 1322, 1337 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (holding President Clinton's Executive Order disqualifying from certain federal
contracts employers who hire permanent replacement workers during a lawful strike was
preempted by the NLRA, and adopting the view that "the result [in Boston Harbor] would
have been entirely different.. . if Massachusetts had passed a general law or the Governor
had issued an Executive Order requiring all construction contractors doing business with the
state to enter into [project labor agreements]"); and Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v.
Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 138, 170 (D.D.C. 2001) (interpreting the NLRA as finding that
project labor agreements may neither be required nor prohibited on federally funded projects
and that President Bush's Executive Order is "clearly a regulatory act rather than the
government act[ing] just like a private contractor would act [because the executive order]
'sets a blanket rule and does not require government agencies to act on a project-by-project
basis, as was the case in Boston Harbor."') (citation omitted.), rev'd, 295 F.3d 28, (D.C.
Cir. 2002); and Associated Builders & Contractors of R.I. v. City of Providence, 108 F.
Supp. 2d 73, 84 (D.R.I. 2000) (rejecting the city's immunity, and noting that "[t]he City's
action in this case is not limited to one particular project..." and that "[tihis distinction has
been important to courts refusing to apply the market participant exception, because a
policy, regardless of the motive behind it, is more 'regulatory' than 'proprietary' in nature
than a single contracting ...decision") (citations omitted); with Chamber of Commerce v.
Reich (Reich II), 83 F.3d 439, 440-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying rehearing en banc in Reich
1,and reporting that the Reich I panel's reasoning in its original decision turned not on the
fact that the government had promulgated a general policy but that the purpose and effect of
the policy promulgated was to alter the balance of power in collective bargaining) rehearing
en banc denied, Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 83 F.3d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Lott
Constructors, Inc. v. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 93-5636, 1994 WL
263851, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 1994) (upholding as immunity-protected a government-wide
procurement policy requiring project labor agreements on public works projects in the
context of specific findings "project agreements advance the interest of efficiency, quality,
and timeliness...").
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Allbaugh,29 the D.C. Circuit categorically rejected as irrational the
exclusion of a government-wide procurement policy from the immunity's
protection just because the policy was incorporated in a "blanket rule." As
the court stated: "[T]here simply is no logical justification for holding that
if an executive order establishes a consistent practice regarding the use of
PLAs, it is regulatory even though the only decisions governed by the
executive order are those that the federal government makes as [a] market
participant., 30 Or, courts may limit the immunity to market participation in
the purchase of goods and services, excluding all other types of market
participation by government entities. 3' Finally, there is the question of
what demonstration, if any, is needed to show that private actors in fact do
engage in the activities that the government wishes to pursue.32 The only
thing that most of the lower court decisions have in common is their lack of
a coherent theoretical foundation from which to make these determinations.
Part III suggests a method to resolve that defect.
III. INTERPRETING LABOR PREEMPTION'S MARKET PARTICIPANT
IMMUNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT

It has been almost a decade since Stephen Gardbaum published his
29. Building & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
30. Id. at 35 (quotations omitted).
31. See Aeroground, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 170 F. Supp. 2d 950, 95658 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (denying immunity in context of challenge to policy of requiring labor
peace agreements from all employers and their subcontractors who perform work at the cityowned airport, concluding that, notwithstanding that "[tihe airport commission may have
intended the rule solely as a device for increasing the airport's revenues" by averting labor
unrest, the immunity is denied because the policy extends beyond "enabl[ing] the city
[itself] to procure goods or services in order to operate as a business"); Associated Builders
& Contractors of R.I. v. City of Providence, 108 F. Supp. 2d 73, 82-83 (D.R.I. 2000)
(denying immunity to city that provided a tax stabilization agreement to a developer
constructing a downtown hotel, reasoning that the "City in this case is not 'purchasing'
construction services or otherwise exhibiting behavior analogous to that of private parties in
the marketplace."); Hudson County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Jersey City,
960 F. Supp. 823, 833 (D.N.J. 1996) (limiting market participation to "interacting in the
market as the owner or manager of property"). But see Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v.
Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 35, (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that "the Government unquestionably
is the proprietor of its own funds, and when it acts to ensure the most effective use of those
funds, it is acting in a proprietary capacity ... [even when] Government is a lender to or a
benefactor of, rather than the owner of, a project...").
32. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich (Reich I), 74 F.3d 1322, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(referring to three possible approaches, without resolving the issues: 1) a "permissibility"
test: would a private actor be "permitted" to engage in the activity the government entity
wishes to pursue; 2) a "typicality" test: what activity a "typical" private actor "ordinarily
would" engage in; and 3) a compromise "rationality" test: whether the government entity
has "'go[ne] beyond the conduct that would be normally or economically rational for a
private party"').
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influential article The Nature of Preemption.33 In it he showed: 1) that
Congress's power to preempt does not derive from the Supremacy Clause
but rather the Necessary and Proper Clause 34 and 2) that certain federalism
constraints apply to the exercise of the preemption power. Although
Gardbaum did not link these insights to preemption's market participant
immunity, they are nevertheless linked, and from that connection emerges a
framework for understanding better the scope of the immunity.
Gardbaum's argument cuts against the grain of conventional wisdom
that "preemption derives automatically and straightforwardly from the
Supremacy Clause."3 Gardbaum reasons that this standard view "fails to
explain how the [Supremacy] Clause can be understood to grant any
powers at all [when it] functions as the Constitution's dispute resolution
mechanism, resolving.., conflicts resulting from concurrent state and
federal powers.,,36 The need to find an independent source for Congress's
preemptive authority is developing an academic following.37 Gardbaum
finds Congressional preemptive authority in the Necessary and Proper
Clause.3" That conclusion reveals the contingent nature of Congressional
preemptive authority. The prerequisite of "proper" in the Necessary and
33. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994)
[hereinafter Nature of Preemption]. Gardbaum expanded on this article in Stephen
Gardbaum, Rethinking ConstitutionalFederalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795 (1996) [hereinafter
Rethinking Federalism].
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof.").
35. Rethinking Federalism, supra note 33 at 803; see id. at n. 28; Rethinking
Federalism, supra note 33 at 797 n. I1 (citing authority for the conventional view that the
issue in preemption is not congressional power but rather congressional intent).
36. Id. at 804. See also Nature of Preemption, supra note 33 at 774 (arguing that "the
Supremacy Clause does not empower, but rather resolves a particular problem arising out of
the powers granted by other parts of the Constitution; namely, conflicts resulting from
concurrent state and federal powers"); id. at 774-76 (concluding that the Supremacy Clause
operates only to trump state law that actually contravenes a federal right or prohibition, as
opposed to providing Congress legislative authority to occupy a field of regulation).
37. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
2090 (2000) ("The power to preempt state law, if one exists, must be found elsewhere" than
in the Supremacy Clause); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 265 (2000)
(finding in Supreme Court preemption cases a "tacit recognition" that obstacle preemption
does not originate directly from the Supremacy Clause but rather from Congress's
preemptive authority).
38. Just because Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce, it does not
follow that Congress automatically also has the power to preempt state lawmaking capacity
touching all objects of federal Commerce Clause regulation. Nature of Preemption, supra
note 33 at 777, 806 (emphasizing that the text of the Commerce Clause does not contain any
included federal power to abolish concurrent state authority); see also Rethinking
Federalism, supra note 33 at 805 n.35 (summarizing why the Commerce Clause by its own
force does not include preemptive authority).
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Proper Clause imposes a federalism-based constraint on Congress, as the
Court recently has noted.39 Without relying on the Necessary and Proper
Clause, one still might find such constraints in implicit federalism-based
structural limitations on Congress's exercise of its preemptive authority,
identical to those that operate on any exercise of federal regulation of the
States as States.40 I show next that Boston Harbor's market participant
immunity functions as such a federalism-based restraint on Congress's
power to preempt.
Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority4 1abandoned the
effort, first taken up in National League of Cities v. Usery,42 to limit
congressional authority over the States by carving out areas of exclusive
state power. Instead, the court adopted a vision that "the limits [on
congressional power] are structural, not substantive - i.e. that States must
find their protection from congressional regulation through the national
political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state
activity. 43
Garcia's confidence in the efficacy of the national political process
soon waned. Without re-embracing Usery, the Court soon resumed an
active role as arbiter of federalism constraints on the Congress. Over the
past decade, the Court has restricted severely Congress's authority to
provide a private right of action against the States for damages in both
federal courts and state courts. It has declared twice that Congress
exceeded its Commerce Clause power by regulating non-economic
intrastate activity touching areas of traditional local concerns, and twice the
Court has struck down federal statutes because Congress unconstitutionally
had "commandeered" either states' legislative or executive processes as a
means of enforcing federal law."
39. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (concluding that federal
legislation that "violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various
constitutional provisions ... is not a 'La[w] ...proper for carrying into Execution the
Commerce Clause'... " (citing Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope
of Federal Power: A JurisdictionalInterpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L. J.
267, 297-326 (1993) (emphasis in original).
40. See Rethinking Federalism, supra note 33 at 814-17 (arguing that even McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) limited legislative authority to that which
is "plainly adapted" to effect federal enumerated concerns and "appropriate" and consistent
"with the letter and spirit of the Constitution").
41. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
42. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
43. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (characterizing the holding in
Garcia).
44. See Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Against Public Entities After
Garrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41, 41-43 (2001) (collecting cases and critiquing the contraction of
private remedies against the States under the ADA); Roger C. Hartley, The Alden Trilogy:
Praise and Protest, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 323, 328-36 (2000) (citing authority
evaluating the "new federalism" and evaluating remedies against the States other than
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But even as the Court reemerged as an ardent champion of judicial
activism to promote constitutional federalism, its federalism decisions
continued to foster the efficacy of federalism's non-judicial, political
safeguards. One example is the "clear statement" rule.45 An even more
prominent example is the Court's nondiscrimination rule, whose pedigree
can be traced to dicta in Garcia. In Garcia, the Court left open the
possibility of judicial intervention if "the internal safeguards of the political
process have [not] performed as intended. ' 6 Three years later, in South
Carolina v. Baker,47 the Court reaffirmed that "Garcia left open the
possibility that some extraordinary defects in the national political process
might render congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the
Tenth Amendment." 48 In South Carolina v. Baker, the Court upheld
federal legislation regulating the States' issuance of bonds, concluding that
the national political process in that case was not defective since South
Carolina had not "alleged that it was deprived of any right to participate in
the national political process or that it was singled out in a way that left it
politically isolated and powerless." 49
Then, in 1992, one year before Boston Harbor,the Court decided New
York v. United States.5 ° New York clarified how the national political
process might malfunction to cause the political powerlessness and
isolation of the States referred to in South Carolinav. Baker. In New York,
the Court invalidated the take-title provision of a federal regulatory
program to dispose of nuclear waste because the provision required the
state either to legislate a solution to the accumulation of low-level nuclear
waste or claim ownership and liability for the waste. The Court held this
provision unconstitutional because Congress has no authority to
"'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States.' 5. The Court
distinguished Garcia as a case that concerned the authority of Congress to
"subject state governments to generally applicable laws ' 5 2 that impose the
same obligations on the States and similarly situated private actors.
private damage actions); Roger C. Hartley, The New Federalism and the ADA: State
Sovereign Immunity From Private Damage Suits After Boerne, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 481, 486-96 (1998) (evaluating the "new federalism").
45. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (reasoning that "'[i]n
traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the
requirement of clear statement assures that the [Congress] has in fact faced [the competing
interests of the States]"' (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
46. Garcia,469 U.S. at 556.
47. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
48. Id. at 512.
49. Id. at 513.
50. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
51. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)).
52. Id. at 160.
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Finally, in Reno v. Condon,53 the Court unanimously upheld a federal
law barring state motor vehicle departments from disclosing (or selling)
personal information obtained from individuals applying for a driver's
license or car registration. The justices reasoned that the statute does not
require state legislatures to legislate, does not require state officials to assist
in enforcing federal law
regulating private citizens, and does not "regulate
54
the States exclusively.
These cases show that the generally-applicable-laws doctrine is a
means of distinguishing between valid and invalid federal commandeering.
If the Congress were to impose different obligations on otherwise similarly
situated states and private actors, then the anti-commandeering rules would
apply. Since preemption operates as negative commandeering (state is
barred from acting),55 the generally-applicable-laws doctrine
then also
6
distinguishes between valid and invalid efforts to preempt.1
Professor Tribe in his treatise has offered an explanation for a related
constitutional nondiscrimination rule that may explain why the Court has
been so insistent that federal legislation not "regulate the States
exclusively," but instead subject them to "generally applicable laws." The
nondiscrimination rule discussed by Professor Tribe is found in a midcentury tax case that, somewhat ironically, also is captioned "New York v.
United States. 57 Its precedential value is weakened by the absence of a
majority opinion, but there the Court reasoned that Congress may not levy
a tax that falls only on the States. As Professor Tribe explains,
Such discriminatory taxation (although the Justices did not
develop this rationale) would deprive the states of their natural
non-governmental allies in the legislative process, and thus
weaken the political check upon Congress to the point that
judicial intervention could perhaps be justified under Garcia ....
Plainly, the Court could apply [the nondiscrimination rule] in
cases concerning congressional taxes or regulation. 5
Discriminatory preemption rules that bar states from market
-participation lawfully engaged in by similarly situated private actors also

53. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
54. Id. at 151. (emphasis added).
55. See Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-PrintzWorld, 36 TULSA
L.J. 11, 14-15 (2000) (discussing how "preemption law... operates as a sort of negative
commandeering by foreclosing state legislatures from pursuing the policies they prefer").
56. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1259, 1285
(in the context of international relations, and relying on College Savings Bank v. Florida
PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Board., 527 U.S. 666 (1999), concluding that "Congress
lacks the power to prohibit the states from engaging in... activity unless it also prohibits
private parties from engaging in the activity..
57. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
58. LAURENCE H. TRtBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW 915-16 (2000).
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threaten to "deprive the States of their natural non-governmental allies" and
create the political powerlessness and isolation of the States referred to in
South Carolina v. Baker.59
The above discussion illuminates the plausibility that constitutional
considerations grounded in federalism shape Boston Harbor's market
participant immunity.6 ° If this constitutional interpretation of the immunity
is accurate, then it is necessary to explain why, in the dormant commerce
power cases, the Court repeatedly states that Congress is at liberty to
dispense with the immunity. 6' That, of course, can be true only if the
immunity is not constitutionally required.
In the preemption context the immunity serves the federalism function
of assuring that when Congress legislates, it does not "regulate the States
exclusively," but instead subjects them to "generally applicable laws."
None of this reasoning, of course, applies in dormant commerce power
cases since there the courts limit state autonomy in the absence of federal
legislation. As one commentator has put it, in the domain of dormant
Commerce Clause methodology, the function of the market participant
immunity is "not [to] affect the power of Congress, but merely [to]
restrict[] the power of [the] courts to strike down state action ....62 Since
it is not a structural limitation on the Congress, it makes sense that
Congress reserves the power to eliminate the dormant Commerce Clause
market participant immunity if it wishes.
A constitutional interpretation of the immunity also requires an
explanation of why in Boston Harbor the Court cited the absence of a
congressional intent to deny the immunity. 63
If the immunity is
constitutionally required, then is congressional intent to provide it not
immaterial? Not necessarily. The Court has developed methods to avoid
unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions.64 Concluding that

59. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
60. This plausibility is reinforced by a recent federalism-induced reluctance by the
Court to infer preemption from congressional silence. See Drummonds, supra note 3, at
563.
61. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia Decision on the MarketParticipantException to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 727, 742
(1995) ("A long line of Supreme Court cases has established that Congress may overturn
dormant Commerce Clause decisions by mere bicameral action, without resort to the

cumbersome [constitutional] amendment process. The Court, moreover, squarely has held
that this principle extends to decisions concerning the market-participant exception.").

62. See id. at 755.
63. See supra notes 21 - 25 and accompanying text.
64. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,concurring).
The technique has been employed often in labor law cases. See, e.g., Edward J.DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (avoiding
potential free speech issues, the Court held that the Act does not prohibit peaceful
handbilling); NLRB v. Catholic Bishops, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (holding that that Board
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labor law includes an implicit congressionally approved market participant
immunity nicely avoids reaching the constitutional issues presented by the
absence of such approval. Finding a congressionally intended market
participant immunity thus leaves for another day what to do if such an
intent were ever found wanting.
Several important consequences flow from rooting the market
participant immunity in the Constitution. First, it is unwarranted for the
immunity to provide local government less autonomy to participate in the
market than labor law provides private actors. Accordingly, the first thing
that should matter in a labor preemption market participant dispute is
whether federal labor law would privilege a similarly situated private sector
employer to engage in the activity for which local government is claiming
immunity protection.
But it also is appropriate to inquire into the local government's
purpose. 65 In Boston Harbor,the Court, quoting from its previous decision
in Gould, reasoned that "government occupies a unique position of power
in our society, and its conduct, regardless of form, is rightly subject to
special restraints., 66 The Constitution's non-discrimination principle,
therefore, does not prescribe absolute parity between government and the
private sector. While a private actor might lawfully engage in a boycott
"on the basis of a labor policy concern rather than a profit motive, 6 7 this is
not true for government entities. "States have a qualitatively different role
to play from private parties.... [A]s regulator of private conduct, the State
is more powerful than private parties.,,6' Accordingly, it is appropriate for
the immunity to test for the purpose to determine when government's
"actions [are] taken to serve the government's own needs rather than those
' 69
of society as a whole.
In sum, rooting labor preemption's market participant immunity in the
Constitution requires inquiry into the scope of permissible activities by
private sector employers as well as local government's purpose. There are
other implications: Because a constitutional right is at stake, the analysis of
lacks jurisdiction over lay teachers in a "church-operated" school , while avoiding "difficult
and sensitive" questions dealing with separation of church and state); NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (avoiding difficult free speech issues, the
Court held that the Act does not prohibit point of sale picketing when the purpose is to
induce consumers to boycott products produced by primary employer and sold at a neutral
employer's place of business).
65. See supra notes 27 - 28 and accompanying text.
66. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders &
Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 228 (1993) (quoting Wisc. Dep't of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475
U.S. 282, 290 (1986)).
67. Id. at 229.
68. Id.
69. Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 691 (5th
Cir. 1999).
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a state's purpose should eschew reliance on per se rules such as denying the
immunity if government promulgates a government-wide policy or chooses
strategies to advance its proprietary interests that would be unusual for
similarly situated private sector businesses.7 ° Such per se rules deny the
States the strict judicial scrutiny normally provided when deprivation of a
constitutional right is at stake.
IV. PREEMPTION OF LIVING WAGE AND LABOR PEACE POLICIES

A.

The Living Wage Movement

Nationwide, a community-based movement for economic justice has
coalesced around three premises. First, "anyone who works for a living
should earn enough money to raise a family outside of poverty."71 Second,
governmental expenditures should not be used to finance substandard
wages that preclude full-time workers from moving out of poverty.72
Third, when citizen tax dollars finance substandard wages, "taxpayers
encounter a forced subsidy to cover the needs that businesses fail to
provide through wages, including healthcare, food stamps, tax credits,
housing assistance, and other social costs of the wage gap and inequality."73
Acting on these premises, local governments have enacted living wage
ordinances that typically "cover employers who hold large city or county
service contracts or [otherwise] benefit from public tax dollars [such as] tax
abatements or other economic development subsidies '7 4 or lease of public

land. 75 Normally, living wage ordinances "require private businesses that
benefit from public money to pay their workers.., at least enough to bring76
a family of four to the federal poverty line, currently $8.20 an hour.,
Presently, eighty-three cities, counties, and school districts have adopted
living wage policies and an estimated seventy-five
campaigns
are
....
77
underway nationwide to secure them in other local jurisdictions.
70. For lower court decisions that take contrasting views on these issues, see supra
notes 27 - 30 and accompanying text.
71. See MaryBeth Lipp, Legislators' Obligation to Support a Living Wage: A
Comparative ConstitutionalVision of Justice,75 S. CAL. L. REV. 475, 486-87 (2002).
72. Id. at 487.
73. Id. Living wage policies also benefit to the local economy from increased
disposable income and a broadening of the tax base. Id. at 488-90.
74. Jen Kern, Working for a Living Wage, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR at * 1, Jan. 1,
2001, available at 2001 WL 15520440.
75. Lipp, supra note 71 at 487.
76. Kern, supra note 74 at *2.
77. For an up-to-date listing, see ACORN Living Wage Resource Ctr., The Living
Wage Movement: Building Power in Our Workplaces and Neighborhoods, available at
http://www.livingwagecampaign.org/introcontent.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
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Preemption of Living Wage Policies

It seems unlikely that living wage policies will be found immune from
preemption by operation of the market participant doctrine. The case for
living wage ordinances, as shown, revolves primarily around moral claims
and it is unlikely that a state or municipal government could demonstrate
that their purpose is advancement of government's proprietary interests.
Living wage policies, nevertheless, are likely to escape preemption
because they are minimum wage statutes, falling within the rule of
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Insurance
Co.7" The fact that a living wage ordinance is applicable only to employees
engaged in tasks related to a state's procurement needs should not require a
contrary result. That was the court's conclusion court in Babler Bros. v.
Roberts79 where the state set overtime provisions for work done on publicly
financed construction projects unless the workers are covered for overtime
provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. 80 The court refused to
distinguish Metropolitan Life on the ground that, unlike the legislation in
that case, the statute did not apply to all employees. 8 ' Nor did the court
fault the state for exempting employers bound to collective bargaining
agreements, reasoning that the exemption would avoid "interfer[ing] with
collective bargaining."82
C.

The Labor Peace Movement

Fearing that labor disputes will interfere with the delivery of goods,
depreciate the value of purchased services, interfere with the profitability of
joint-venture real estate development contracts, or otherwise threaten
publicly financed programs, government entities have adopted various
labor peace strategies. Public entities are taking their lead from the private
sector, where unions and employers are adopting labor peace agreements,
without any governmental involvement, as a means of harmonizing their
78. 471 U.S. 724, 753 (1985); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co.v.Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,
21 (1987) (upholding a statute that provided for a one-time severance payment on the
occasion of a plant closing, concluding that it was immaterial that the statutory grant applied
only to employees not covered by a contract provision providing such severance pay and
rejecting the argument that the state had sided with employees by granting them by statute
something for which they otherwise would need to bargain). See discussion supra notes 16
- 17 and accompanying text.
79. 995 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1993).
80. Id.at 912-13.
81. Id. at914.
82. Id. at 915. The court added that "the state here has not endeavored to regulate the
bargaining relationship of employers or employees. Rather, the state is enforcing proscribed
working conditions on public projects in which the state and local jurisdictions have a
proprietary interest." Id. at 916.
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labor relations.
1.

No-State-Money Legislation

Following the lead of other states, California has enacted legislation
restricting the use of public money to pro- or anti-union organizations. The
so-called AB 1889 (the Cedillo Act) was enacted in 2000.83 The legislation
regulates state agencies, public employers that receive state funds, and
several categories of private employers either receiving state funds or
conducting business on state property.84
Employers covered by the statute are barred from using state funds to
85
In addition, state contractors
assist, promote, or deter union organizing.
union organizing by
deterring
or
are prohibited from assisting, promoting,
employees performing work on a service contract, including a public works
86
Also, employers
contract, negotiated with the state or a state agency .
or concession
to
a
contract
pursuant
property
on
state
business
conducting
with any
a
meeting
to
hold
with the state may not use state property
employees to assist, promote, or deter union organizing."
These limits on the use of state funds and property are enforced by a
requirement that employers maintain records sufficient to substantiate
compliance with AB 1889 and make these records available for inspection
by the California Attorney General." Violation of the statute is remedied
by an order to reimburse the state for the unlawfully expended funds, plus a
civil penalty equal to twice the amount of the unlawfully used State funds. 9
Suits to enforce AB 1889 may be brought by the California Attorney
General or a state taxpayer, after giving the Attorney General 60 days
notice and the first opportunity to sue. 9°
83. CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 16645-16649 (West 2002) (hereinafter AB 1889). The bill was
authored by Representative Gil Cedillo from Los Angeles.
84. See id. §§ 16645.1-16645.7.
85. See id. §§ 16645.1(a), 16645.4(a). The bar does not apply to the expenditure of
money to address grievances, negotiate collective bargaining agreements, permit unions
access to an employer's facilities or property, or negotiate or carry into effect the provisions
of a voluntary recognition agreement. See id. § 16647(a)-(d).
86. See id. § 16645.3(a).
87. See id. § 16645.5(a).
88. See id. §§ 16645.1-16645.7. Non-state funds co-mingled with state funds in a
single account are all considered state funds. See id. § 16645.8(a).
89. See id. §§ 16645.1 - 16645.7. Employers using public land unlawfully are liable for
a $1,000 fine. See id. § 16645.5(b).

90. Id. §§ 16645.8(b)-(c). In December 2001, the NLRB was asked to initiate an
injunction action in federal court alleging that AB 1889 is preempted by the Act. See
National Labor Relations Board, Office of the General Counsel, California Assembly Bill
1889 (AB 1889) (Prohibitionon the Use of State Funds And Facilities to Promote or Deter
Union Organizing) (May 20, 2002) (reporting the request and requesting an expression of

views from interested parties).

For an analysis of whether AB 1889 should be held
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State Procurement Policy that Requires a Labor Peace
Agreement.

Ordinances requiring companies doing business with local
government to enter into labor peace agreements with a union, in the event
a union initiates an organizing campaign, are unusual but they do exist. 9'
In October 2000, Milwaukee County enacted the first of the ordinances.9 2
The Milwaukee ordinance covers "businesses providing social services or
specialized transportation services under county contracts [in excess of
$250,000]." 9' The covered firms are required to sign agreements with
unions seeking to organize their workers that will prohibit the business
from giving workers misleading information in an attempt to dissuade them
from choosing unionization. These agreements will also permit union
organizers to distribute information at the workplace.94 In addition, it
requires such firms to provide employee address lists to the union, and
forbids the firms from holding captive audience meetings.9 5 In return,
unions may not give workers misleading information, and they are
forbidden to strike, boycott or picket to achieve recognition. 96 The first
legal challenge under the statute, alleging violations of free speech,
association, due process, and labor preemption, was dismissed as moot. 97
3.

Labor Peace Policies Related to Urban Redevelopment Subsidies

Local governments compete with one another to attract the investment
of private capital into the community by offering incentive packages that
include direct grants, low-interest loans, and what is sometimes referred to
as "tax expenditures. '98 Providing economic incentives to private real
preempted by the Act, see discussion infra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
91. Arch Stokes, Robert L. Murphy, Paul E. Wagner, & David S. Sherwyn, Neutrality
Agreements: How Unions Organize New Hotels Without an Employee Ballot, 42 CORNELL
HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q., 86 (Oct. 1, 2001) at *3 & n.5 (reporting the "labor-

peace.., ordinances [were] passed by a number of local governments in recent years...").
92. See David Glenn, Labor of Love: Milwaukee's Home-Care Workers Discover Each
Other, THE NATION, Sept. 3, 2001, at 30, available at 2001 WL 2132832 (reporting the

Milwaukee ordinance was the first in the Wisconsin).
93. Linda Spice, Milwaukee - Area Home Health Care Workers Vote for Union,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL 22768791 (hereinafter Vote
for Union).

94. Id. at *3.
95. David Glenn, supra note 92, at *3.
96. Vote for Union, supra note 93, at *3.

97. See Metro. Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 201 F. Supp. 2d
942, 951-52 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
98. See Rachel Weber, Note, Why Local Economic Development Incentives Don't
Create Jobs: The Role of Corporate Governance, 32 URB. LAW. 97, 100 (2000) (defining

tax expenditures as "forgone revenues or uncollected taxes," and reporting that they are the
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estate developers has "become almost a necessity [in order] to attract
certain types of development, particularly development that will create
public good ... ."99 When the local government offers subsidies to private
real estate developers, it often requires that the private developer enter into
a labor peace agreement as part of the deal.'00
The term "labor peace agreements" connotes more of a generic
concept than a description of any agreement's actual provisions. These
agreements, which are becoming standard labor relations practice in some
0
sectors of the private economy, have literally dozens of variations.' ' What
they have in common is that they permit unions and employers to avoid the
contentious pitched battles of a former era. These agreements typically
address three categories of potential conflict.
Civility: Labor peace agreements usually require both unions and
employers to structure the union organizing campaign around reasoned
arguments rather than mutual disparagement. Unions often agree not to
the
malign the employer, and sometimes to give
102 employer notice of an
•

The employer typically
intent to begin organizing among its employees.
union
that is organizing its
agrees either not to speak against the
employees, or not to03attack or demean the union when expressing its views
about unionization. 1
Access: Usually an employer also agrees to provide employee name
and address information.' 4 Or, the employer may agree to grant the union
most popular form of economic incentive because they "include different forms of tax
abatements, exemptions and reductions, such as corporate income or excise tax exemptions,
property tax abatements, and investment tax credits").
99. See Ira J. Waldman, Public/PrivateDevelopment Partnerships- The Long-Term
Ground Lease, SGO19 ALI-ABA 241, 243 (2001) (concluding that the past two decades
have witnessed a "dramatic increase in [such] public participation in traditionally private
entrepreneurial activities").
100. See Stewart Yerton, N.O. Airport Hotel Deal a Winner for Union; Project is to
Include "Labor Peace Agreements", TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 26, 2000, at A l ("Labor peace
agreements are not uncommon in public projects."); id. (relating the view of the president of
a major corporation engaged in real estate redevelopment financed partially through public
funds that labor peace agreements are "common" and they "happen[] all over the country").
101. See Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition
Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 369, 377-87 (2001) (hereinafter The Newest Civil Rights Movement) (reviewing the
development of and variations within neutrality agreements).
102. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and
Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 48 (2001) (discussing labor peace
agreements regulating neutrality in union collective bargaining).
103. See id. at 47 (reporting that ninety-three percent of the labor peace agreements
surveyed "contained explicit neutrality language" and sometimes defining neutrality as
"'neither helping nor hindering' the union's organizing effort", or a concession "that the
employer would not communicate opposition").
104. See generally Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 102 at 48. See also The Newest Civil
Right Movement, supra note 101 at 384-385.
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access to its' physical property in order to enable the union to communicate
directly with employees.0 5
Recognition: A labor peace agreement also may provide for union
recognition upon the union's demonstration of majority support of the
bargaining unit employees. This usually is manifested by the union
presenting signed authorization cards. 0 6 One of the most interesting
conclusions uncovered by recent empirical research is that when a union is
able to secure a labor peace agreement, organized success levels increase
considerably and when employees choose unionization the union almost
always is able to obtain a first contract. 0 7
Because there may be different legal consequences, it is useful to
distinguish two contexts when a state or municipal government might
require some type of labor peace agreement from a real-estate developer as
a condition to its receiving public financial subsidies.
The first is when government and a private real estate developer enter
into a business relationship that provides for the governmental entity to
share in the profitability of, and assume part of the risk of, the venture.
Often, a redevelopment agency or a convention authority negotiates a
ground lease that provides for both a minimum rent and a higher
"percentage rent" that varies depending on the profitability of the
venture. 18 This was the case in the construction of a convention center and
hotel in San Francisco.' °9 In other cities it might be the state convention
authority that owns land that it wants to lease to a private developer for the
purpose of building a convention hotel that will support the operations of a
government-owned convention center. 10
The second context when a labor peace agreement becomes part of the
negotiations is when a private developer is seeking from government either

105. See id. at 385 n.84 (citing cases of examples of circumstances in which union access
must legally be denied).

106. Seventy-three percent of the agreements in Eaton and Kriesky's sample of
agreements (81 of 111) provided for card-check recognition. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra
note 102 at 47-48.
107. See id. at 52 (finding that labor peace agreements that pair a neutrality pledge and
card check recognition result in recognition 78.2 percent of the time).
108. For an excellent discussion and analysis of government's use of ground leases to
facilitate urban redevelopment, see Waldman, supra note 99 at 243-44 (concluding that in
the past local government tended to sell excess property but "[i]n the past ten to fifteen years
the trend has shifted and now [local governments] look at their real estate holdings from a
profit potential, perspective ... [and utilizing] [t]he long-term ground lease has become a
primary tool ... in their asset management and income maximization activities").
109. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
110. See Gregory Smith, Agency Would Finance Hotel, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 5, 2001 at
AI, available at 2001 WL 29797973 (reporting a requested $10 to $16 million loan from a

convention authority to finance the construction of a convention hotel to be built on land
owned by the convention authority).
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a direct cash subsidy, loan, or loan guarantee. 1 Sometimes the offer of tax
abatement for a set term (often ten years) provides the impetus for a local
that a
government to request security for its investment by insisting
12
developer agree to a labor peace agreement as part of the deal.'
D.

Preemptionof Labor Peace Policies

1.

Preemption of no-state-money policies

It is not likely that federal labor law preempts "no-state-money
policies": legislation that prohibits recipients of public funds from using
those funds to promote or deter union organizing." 13 It is possible, though
unlikely, that these policies could qualify for preemption's market
participant immunity." 14 But even if they do not, a state's preference to
remain neutral by not permitting its money to be used to promote or deter
unionization does not contravene any of the values advanced by either the
Garmon or Machinist preemption doctrines.
First, Garmon's protected/arguably protected wing is ill-suited as a
preemption theory because that wing of Garmon addresses interference
with Section 7 rights and employers do not have Section 7-protected
rights. 5 Therefore, even if denying a private sector employer the use of
public funds to promote or deter unionization were viewed as having some
111. See, e.g. Jim Weiker, Union Demand Threatens Denver Marriott Convention
Center Hotel, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEws, June 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL
22619928 (reporting a labor peace agreement as part of a $55.3 million tax subsidy (onequarter of the cost of the hotel)). In New Haven, the city made $10 million available to help
finance the renovation of a hotel and in return the developer agreed to enter into a labor
peace agreement with the union representing the hotel's employees. See Lab. Rel. Rep. No.
243, at A-8 (Dec. 18, 1997).
112. See Gregory Smith, Hotel Developers In Line For $7.75 Million Tax Break,
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 12, 1999, at Cl (reporting a labor peace agreement involved in
negotiations for city agreement to waive taxes for ten years, a concession worth an
estimated $7.75 million to the developer).
113. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
114. No-state-money policies do not necessarily diminish labor strife; government
simply refuses to finance it. States, though able to advance persuasive moral claims on
behalf of such policies, will be hard pressed to demonstrate a proprietary self-interested
motivation.
115. Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act, titled "Rights of employees as to organization,
collective bargaining, etc." provides that "Employees shall have the right to selforganization ... and to engage in... concerted activities for the purpose of... mutual aid or
protection .. " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2002). See Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor
Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE L.J. 355, 379 (1990)
("Section 7 protects only conduct of employees, not of employers. Indeed, the Act nowhere
vests employers with protected rights; on its face, it forbids certain employer actions, but
protects none."). But see discussion infra note 10.
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adverse effect on an employer's ability to oppose unionization, the
employer has suffered no interference with section 7 rights.
Nor is
6
implicated."
wing
prohibited
prohibited/arguably
Garmon's
17
Machinists preemption theory also is not suitable. As noted above,'
Machinists preemption assures that in a labor dispute the parties may
deploy freely the "self-help" economic weapons that labor law leaves
unregulated because Congress intends them "to be controlled by the free
play of economic forces."' 1
Congress did not intend that union
representation decisions should be left to the uncontrolled exercise of either
party's relative economic might. To the contrary, the Act favors
unencumbered employee free choice." 9
The result would be the same were courts to conclude that Machinists
preemption reaches state action affecting representation election outcomes.
The Act's representation election policies are not frustrated by no-statemoney policies. Employers remain free to exercise all of the options
federal law permits for opposing unionization. " The State's private sector
business partners are simply precluded from using state funds or property
for persuader activities."'
116. Legislation barring the use of public funds to encourage or discourage unionization
does not remotely regulate any activity that even arguably is prohibited by federal law.
117. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
118. See Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wis. Emp. Rel. Comm'n., 427 U.S. 132, 140-42
(1976).
119. For example, section 8(b)(7) of the Act denies unions the unbridled use of
recognition and organizational picketing. The Court in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375
U.S. 405 (1964), held the Act bars an employer from using its superior economic position to
influence election outcomes by making an unconditional grant of benefits. Indeed, labor
law restricts the parties from deploying many strategies to influence employee choice that
are not necessarily coercive but disrupt "laboratory conditions." See, e.g., In re General
Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124, 127 (1948).
120. See N.Y. Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 532 n.21 (1979)
(holding that labor preemption analysis must focus only on the "the scope, purport, and
impact of the state program"); id. at 531-32 (holding that only state action that alters the
economic balance between labor and management is subject to preemption). In Chamber pf
Commerce v. Lockyer, 2002 WL 31207130 (C.D. Cal. 2002), the district court found
California's AB 1889 is preempted under the Machinists doctrine. The Court reasoned that
section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act "manifests a congressional intent to encourage free
debate on issues dividing labor and management" (internal quotations omitted), AB 1889
"prevents free debate," and, therefore, AB 1889 is preempted because it "regulates speech."
In October 2002, the NLRB General Counsel signaled his "serious concern" that recently
adopted no-state-money policies in New York may be preempted because they "will
effectively regulate conduct that is intended by Congress to be free from governmental
interference" and interfere with employer free speech rights shielded by the Taft-Hartley
Act. See NLRB Asks New York, New Jersey Officials to Explain Their Labor Neutrality
Laws, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) no. 236 at A- 1 (Dec. 9, 2002).
121. Litigation involving city council resolutions in support of unions is instructive in
this regard. See Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 95 F.3d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that resolution to discontinue $40,000 per year in official advertising in a
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Preemption of state procurement policies that require a labor
peace agreement

A state adopts a qualitatively different sort of labor peace policy when
it goes beyond measures designed to secure its own neutrality and adopts
ones requiring a commitment of neutrality from its business partners.
Absent market participant immunity, most of these policies would 1be22
unlawful by operation of Machinists, though not Garmon, preemption.
Nor would Garmon's arguably prohibited wing apply. The normal
provisions of a labor neutrality agreement do not violate section 8(a)(2) or
any other section of the Act. 123 Garmon's arguably prohibited wing would
not support preemption in either event, however, because it exists to protect
24
the NLRB's primary jurisdiction to remedy unfair labor practices.
Conditional business relationships that require business partners to agree
under certain circumstances to labor peace policies create "no realistic risk
of [state] interference with the Labor Board's primary jurisdiction to
enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices., 2 2 Any
person believing that a labor peace agreement violates the Act can test that
belief by filing an unfair labor practice petition with the NLRB.
Machinists offers a more promising preemption theory. As noted
above, conventional Machinists principles would not likely support
preemption because Congress did not intend to leave employee choice
regarding unionization to "the free play of economic forces.' 26 However,

newspaper involved in a labor dispute was not preempted. The court reasons that workers
have a time-honored right to request consumer boycotts, consumers have a time-honored
right to honor such requests, and preempting a local government's decision to withdraw
support from a struck employer amounts to "declar[ing] that cities must, notwithstanding
their wishes, involuntarily patronize struck or boycotted businesses." This is a declaration a
court should not make "at least in cases in which [government] action [does] not have some
'real effect' or practical economic impact on the employer that is either different from that
of the ordinary consumer or is otherwise governmental in nature."); see also Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 119 (1994) (reasoning that labor preemption is limited to
governmental actions that have a "real effect on federal rights").
122. Garmon's protected/arguably protected wing would not support preemption of a
state's financial inducement to forego conduct the Act permits because an employer
possesses no section 7 rights. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. But see
Aeroground, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 170 F. Supp. 2d 950, 955 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (applying Garmon "to conduct related to the activities regulated by section 9 of the
act"). See also discussion, infra note 127.
123. See The Newest Civil Rights Movement, supra note 101, at 401-04. But see id. at
nn.170, 174 (collecting commentary taking a contrary view).
124. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. S.D. County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 198 (1978).
125. Id. at 198.
126. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 140 (1976). See supra notes 11, 117 and accompanying text.
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it is reasonable to assume that most courts would be inclined to expand
Machinists if a state were to adopt policies that would alter substantially
national labor policy's customary methods for determining employee free
choice. Courts so inclined to expand Machinists probably would conclude
that a typical labor peace agreement would fall within Machinists's
proscriptions by requiring some or all of the following: employer
neutrality, access to employer property, and card-check recognition. 121 If
this is an accurate prediction, qualification for the immunity then becomes
the crucial issue. That question is taken up next.
Certainly, there is nothing in federal labor law prohibiting a privatesector actor from deciding voluntarily not to do business except with
employers who, for example, agree to stay neutral during a union
organizing campaign.1 28 Accordingly, whether the immunity applies when
a government entity does this depends on an evaluation of purpose.
Government is likely to have a difficult task persuading a court that its
proprietary interest was the motivating force when it enacts an across-theboard requirement of a labor peace agreement from all those doing business
with it (even if limited to transactions exceeding a certain dollar amount).
It is hard to imagine what credible demonstration could confirm
government's proprietary motivation for such broad legislation. 29
127. See discussion of typical provisions of labor peace agreements supra notes 98-103
and accompanying text. Section 16645.3(a) of AB 1889, the California legislation, prohibits
state contractors from assisting, promoting, or deterring union organizing by employees
performing work on a contract negotiated with the state. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text. While this does not require executing a labor peace agreement, it does
prohibit all behaviors included in the phrase "deterring union organizing." The applicability
of Machinists' preemption theory would seem to depend on how great a "thumb on the
scale" a court perceives this limitation to be.
In October 2002, the NLRB General Counsel signaled a recently adopted New Jersey
executive order may be preempted. The order requires state contractors providing uniforms
for state employees to "adopt a neutrality position with respect to attempts to organize by
their employees" and requires the state contractors to "agree to voluntarily recognize a
union when a majority of workers have signed cards authorizing representation." In a letter
to the State, the NLRB General Counsel stated that the executive order "appears to regulate
conduct that is both within the [NLRB's] jurisdiction and intended by Congress to be free
from governmental interference" and also "appear[s] to interfere with rights under the
NLRA to freely discuss labor relations issues and to access the [NLRB] through the filing of
charges or participation in representation proceedings." See NLRB Asks New York, New
Jersey Officials to Explain Their Labor Neutrality Laws, DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA) no. 236 at
A-I (Dec. 9, 2002).
128. Indeed a company could have a policy to do business only with unionized
employers. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders
& Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 229 (1993)("A private actor.., can participate in a boycott of
).
a supplier on the basis of [either] a labor policy concern [or] a profit motive ...
129. See also New England Health Care Employees Union v. Rowland, No. 3-01-CV464 (JCH), slip op. at 18 (D. Conn. May 7, 2002) (finding insufficient evidence of
proprietary need for public funding to hire striker replacements for struck nursing homes).
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More narrowly tailored labor peace legislation, such as Milwaukee's,
presents a very different situation. As noted above,130 the Milwaukee labor
peace ordinance encompasses only social service agencies and specialized
transportation services for the elderly and disabled when the County
contract exceeds $250,000. The covered firms are not required to remain
silent in the face of a union organizing drive but rather must refrain from
providing misleading information; the companies may not hold captive
audience meetings; they must provide union organizers name and address
information; and they must provide the union workplace access. For their
part, unions may not attempt to promote the union by giving workers
misleading information and they are forbidden to strike, boycott or picket
to obtain representation rights. While the inquiry into purpose inevitably is
fact-specific, the County may well be able to demonstrate that this
legislation is narrowly designed to protect from disruption certain city
services delivered to a particularly vulnerable segment of the community:
the disabled, seniors and other vulnerable citizens.'31
3.

Labor peace policies related to economic development subsidies

State or municipal government might choose to include a labor peace
agreement as part of an urban redevelopment plan that also includes
providing a real-estate developer a public subsidy to encourage investment
in the community.'3 2 Then government is not participating in the market
for goods and services, as in Boston Harbor,but is participating in the real
estate or capital markets. Can participation in these markets ever qualify
for the market participant immunity? The analysis developed in this article
demonstrates that the answer should be yes.
130. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
131. Making such detailed inquiries into the circumstances surrounding legislative
enactment is something courts are quite adept at doing. See, e.g., New York State Chapter,
Inc. v. New State Thruway Auth., 88 N.Y.2d 56, 666 N.E.2d 185, 643 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Ct.
App. 1996) (examining record to determine if it demonstrates that the state agency made a
focused inquiry into whether a required project labor agreement would advance the interests
in a state competitive bidding statute). The causality inquiry can result in the conclusion
that the government had a mixed motive: both a proprietary interest and a desire to respond
to political pressure. Then the likely resolution will be that government has the burden of
showing that it would have taken the same action for proprietary reasons regardless of the
political pressure. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (using a similar
approach to resolve mixed-motive issues in cases alleging personnel action motivated by
union animus); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(using a similar approach to resolve mixed-motive cases involving constitutionally protected
conduct); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (using a similar approach to resolve mixed-motive cases involving facially neutral
legislation having a discriminatory effect when the issue is government's motive in enacting
the legislation).
132. See supra notes 99, 100 and accompanying text.
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Some cases of government sponsorship of labor peace agreements in
the context of real-estate transactions do fit snugly, if not exactly, into the
Boston Harborparadigm. San Francisco's experience makes the point.
The San Francisco Redevelopment Agency acquired large parcels of
land to build a mixed use development. 133 It awarded a hotel chain and its
development partner a contract to build a hotel and convention center on
the land the Agency owned. The Agency required a labor peace agreement
to be assured that the project would not cause labor strife. Unlike Boston
Harbor,the Agency did not own or manage the hotel covered by the labor
peace agreement. However, the Agency retained a residual interest in the
success of the hotel because the long-term ground lease it negotiated
provided that the hotel's developer would provide "a constant stream of
income [to the city] to support the operation and maintenance of the entire
Yerba Buena facility, especially those areas such as the public gardens, and
cultural amenities which were not expected to generate income. ,1 34 "The
lease was structured so that the hotel would pay the Agency a fixed
'minimum rent' as well as a 'percentage rent"' calculated on the basis of
the hotel's gross proceeds. 135 In upholding the legality of this conditional
business relationship, the court in the Marriott case concluded that the
Agency was acting as a market participant:
In light of this financial arrangement, it is no wonder that in
selecting a developer, the Agency sought to avoid any labor strife
that might delay the opening of the hotel or jeopardize its
economic success.... [T]he Agency was acting as any private
landowner would 136have in protecting a multimillion dollar real
estate investment.
This model of government sponsorship of a labor peace agreement
comes as close to the paradigm of Boston Harboras one is likely to find in
litigation challenging a government-sponsored labor peace agreement. In
many other cases, the fit with Boston Harboris less tight, such as when the
government spends the public's money by offering tax incentives, lowinterest loans, a tax stabilization agreement, or some other financial
inducement to invest financially in the community and in return insists on a

133.

See Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees, Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., No. C-

89-2707, 1993 WL 341286 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1993), on remandfrom, 961 F.2d 1464 (9th
Cir. 1992).
134. Id. at *6.
135. Id. at*1.
136. Id. at *7.In Boston Harbor, the Court never stated that the rule of the case only
applies when government manages the facilities built with public funds. What the Court
said was that when a local government "owns and manages property, for example, it must
interact with private participants in the marketplace." Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of
the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 227 (1993).
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labor peace agreement. 37 Here government also has a multimillion-dollar
public investment to protect but, unlike the San Francisco Redevelopment
Agency, may not have reserved an ownership interest or established a
profit-sharing relationship with private developers whose investment it has
attracted through the public subsidies.
One can anticipate that some courts might be inclined to rely on this
difference to deny the market participant immunity. In the Marriott case
itself, the district court, in dicta, stated:
This would be a different case if the Agency sold a parcel of land
to Marriott, but conditioned the sale on Marriott's guarantee that
they would not oppose unionization efforts at the hotel. In that
situation, [the condition of sale would be preempted] because
once the land was sold, the city's proprietary interest would
vanish, and therefore the condition of sale would only be serving
the city's [labor] policy goals. 3 s
This needs to be examined carefully in light of the reasoning in Boston
Harborand its constitutional underpinnings.
In Marriott, the Redevelopment Agency had a legitimate interest in
protecting [its] multimillion dollar real estate investment." 139 There is no
reason to conclude that, as a matter of law, this interest cannot survive the
sale of public land to a private developer. The constitutional interpretation
of market participant immunity, and indeed Boston Harbor itself, teach
that state and municipal governments are assured an equality of treatment
with the private sector, a right of parity that is lost only when a government
acts with a purpose to regulate rather than to advance its own proprietary
needs. Even after the sale of public land, the government's purpose in
requiring a labor peace agreement may still have nothing to do with setting
labor policy but have everything to do with serving its own need to protect
its investment and the economic development it hopes that investment will
yield.
Typically, when the government provides incentive subsidies for
urban redevelopment, it expects to reap the benefits of certain positive
externalities - such as increased business, income, property, and sales taxes
- as well as reduced public service costs associated with decreased crime,
lower unemployment, and reduced costs incurred by the illness and injury
associated with urban blight. 140 In addition, a local jurisdiction might hope
not only for more jobs but also for better ones than the minimum-wage jobs
137. For a discussion of these types of incentive arrangements and their linkage to labor
peace agreements, see supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
138. Hotel Employees, 1993 WL 341286 at *7.
139. Id. at *7.
140. See Weber, supra note 98 at 101 (suggesting that government expects also to reap
"[n]onpecuniary public benefits, such as enhanced image and higher quality of life").
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currently available in the inner city.
A labor peace agreement can be instrumental in achieving all of these
goals. By promoting workplace efficiency, labor relations peace, and
overall industrial stability throughout the duration of the facilities'
productive life, these agreements substitute partnership between labor and
management for the archetype of the two as antagonists, sometimes
fighting each other to the finish. Such labor stability in turn reasonably can
be expected to encourage additional economic development in the form of
new capital investment and increased patronage of existing businesses. If
in a given case, a local jurisdiction's purpose in requiring a labor peace
goals, preemption's market
agreement is to achieve these economic
14 1
participant immunity should attach.
The court disagreed in Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode
Island v. City of Providence.142 There, the city granted a hotel developer a
tax stabilization agreement that froze property valuation and tax rates for
12 years. In return the city required a project labor agreement. The court
found the PLA condition not protected by the market participant immunity.
Because "[t]he Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a grant of
favorable tax treatment constitutes market participation in its dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence," the court reasoned, it necessarily follows
that "a grant of favorable tax treatment is not sufficient participation in the
marketplace to shield the action from federal preemption.' ' 43 The court
stressed that the city "is not 'purchasing' construction services or otherwise
exhibiting behavior analogous to that of private parties in the marketplace.
It is carrying out its 'primeval governmental activity' of assessing
taxes...."'44 This reasoning misconstrues the Supreme Court's dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as well as the nature of preemption's
market participant immunity.
The Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases stand for the sensible
proposition that the act of "tax assessment or computation" is not in and of
itself market participation.145 Even if a grant of favorable tax treatment
141. For resolution of mixed-motive situations, see supra text accompanying notes 27,
28, 29.
142. 108 F. Supp. 2d 73, 84 (D.R.I. 2000).
143. Id. at 82-83 (citing Hudson County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of
Jersey City, 960 F. Supp. 823, 833 (D.N.J. 1996)).
144. Id. at 83. Accord Hudson County 960 F. Supp. at 833 (rejecting immunity in a case
alleging preemption of an ordinance requiring recipients of publicly financed economic
incentives to make a good faith effort to hire city residents, minorities, and women,
reasoning that the city "is not interacting in the market as the owner or manager of
property").
145. See Camp Nfld./Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997)
(noting that a "discriminatory tax credit program [for] 'the purpose and effect of subsidizing
a particular [local] industry [is not] a form of state participation in the free market'
(quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988))).
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could never qualify as market participation under dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, that conclusion should not control preemption's market
participant immunity. State and local tax policies are often challenged
under dormant Commerce Clause principles because usually, if not always,
these tax policies discriminate against out-of-state commerce. Such tax
discrimination animated early dormant Commerce Clause doctrine1 46 and it
continues to pose grave threats to free interstate trade. 147 By contrast, when
the state acts as the buyer or seller of goods and gives preferences to its
own citizens, the state is considered not to pose substantial free trade
risks.148 It makes sense, therefore, that dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, which is designed to guard against internal division,
provides market participant immunity when local governments buy or sell
goods, but not when they adopt discriminatory tax policies. By its very
nature, tax discrimination threatens "'economic Balkanization' and the
retaliatory acts of other States ....,,149

These sensible reasons for excluding "tax assessment and
computation" from the dormant Commerce Clause's market participant
doctrine do not support the same conclusion with respect to preemption's
market participant immunity. First, unlike the tax policies at issue in the
dormant Commerce Clause cases, those at issue in preemption cases are not
discriminatory.
Second, Boston Harbor teaches that frustration with national labor
policy can only occur when states "regulate." It is senseless formalism to
argue that no "regulation" occurs when a state participates in the market for
the purchase or sale of goods or services or when it retains an ownership
interest in the land being redeveloped but that regulation does occur as a
matter of law when a state participates in any other market, such as
participation in the real estate market or capital markets as lender or
benefactor. 5 °

146. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) (invalidating a state tax that
discriminated against goods produced out-of-state).
147. See Camp Nfld./Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 594-95 (explaining that
"discriminatory [tax] schemes" pose a serious threat to our 'national solidarity').
148. See Coenen, supra note 61 at 744 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) concludes that "marketplace
preferences for local concerns ...pose less of a danger to commerce clause values than
do... discriminatory... taxes").
149. Camp Nfld./Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 577 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322, 325 (1979)); see id. at 595 (concluding that "even the smallest scale
discrimination can interfere with the project of our Federal Union").
150. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(holding that "when [government] acts to ensure the most effective use of [its] funds, it is
acting in a proprietary capacity" and "that the Government is a lender to or a benefactor of,
rather than the owner of, a project is not inconsistent with its acting just as would a private
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Third, in the preemption cases, unlike the dormant Commerce Clause
cases, the state already acts as a market participant; participating in the real
estate and/or capital markets through the sale, leasing, or financing of
buildings or land and the challenged tax policy is merely a strategy for
optimizing the state's interests as a market participant. Adding contractual
provisions to protect one's investments is exactly what private sector actors
do every day.
Finally, limiting preemption's market participant immunity to
scenarios where local government retains an ownership in land or a
managerial interest in facilities erected on leased public property can distort
local decision-making away from optimum financing arrangements. Such
an outcome stands Garcia on its head. The majority in Garcia reversed
League of Cities in large part to free the States from this very kind of
"added price," incurred when local governments were induced to make
sub-optimal decisions in order to fit spending or regulatory decisions into
one of the League of Cities categories that the Court exempted from federal
control. 5 ' Preemption's market participant immunity is a post-Garcia
mechanism designed to fortify federalism. It would be a bitter irony indeed
if this immunity were to be cabined in ways that cause the same distorted
policymaking from which Garciaattempted to free the States.
IV. CONCLUSION

This outwardly coherent system of shared sovereignty we call labor
preemption has been characterized as "a morass of exceptions, limitations,
refinements, and qualifications. ' Perhaps this is the inevitable result of a
doctrine that purports to be bottomed on congressional intent but in fact is
based on judicial elucidation of its own understanding of national labor
policy."' In this article, I have chosen to assume that labor preemption can
entity; a private lender or benefactor also would be concerned that its financial backing be
used efficiently").
151. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (holding that the goal of reserving for the
States the freedom to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the commonwealth
cannot be realized by a system, like that in League of Cities, that depends on "judicial
appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional').
152. Drummonds, supra note 3, at 565.
153. See id. at 533 (concluding that "[too often, the courts use the rubric of fidelity to
the 'full purposes and objectives' of Congress to justify judicial activism in the preemption
field" and that "[sluch judicial policymaking violates ... the constitutional scheme of
federalism...."); David

L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian

Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 507, 516-17 (1986) ( "The core
reality in preemption doctrine is judicial policymaking in the face of congressional silence,
disguised by the occasional cosmetic judicial 'divination of congressional purpose' and
'fabrication of intent."'); Eileen Silverstein, Against Preemption in Labor Law, 24 CONN. L.

REV. 1, 13-15 (1991) (arguing that Court's "rhetoric of preemption obscures the reality of
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be principled. The principle I highlight is the States' constitutional right to
equality of treatment with the private sector when Congress negatively
commandeers a State's legislative processes through the exercise of its
preemptive authority. That act of federal regulation must conform to the
Constitution's nondiscrimination principle, and market participant
immunity is the analytical vehicle for assuring this occurs. There are
significant implications that flow from a constitutional interpretation of
market participant immunity. The most important, perhaps, is that the
immunity cannot be denied when federal law permits private actors to
engage in conduct that the States desire to engage in unless the States act
with a regulatory, rather than a proprietary purpose. Moreover, the
techniques for ascertaining such a purpose must eschew reliance on
simplistic per se tests in favor of a sensitive inquiry into the circumstances
of a governmental entity's decision to engage in the activities for which it
claims preemption's market participant immunity. The Constitution
countenances no less.

bias against labor organizations").

